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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS: HOW
TO THINK ABOUT LATIN AMERICA
VIRON P. VAKY*
What I would like to do today is to identify some of the factors
and dynamics that condition and shape relations among the United
States and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and
which add up to a special context within which that relationship
unfolds. Let me start with what I think is a fundamental character-
istic of the inter-American relationship, and one which has shaped
and determined it, namely, the asymmetry of power.
The nations of the region have had to relate and interact-for
most of their history in relative isolation from the rest of the
world-with a single country that was by far the most powerful and
richest nation in the hemisphere, and in modem times, a super-
power. Most of the history of United States-Latin American rela-
tions can be written in terms of the process by which the United
States sought to legitimize its power and the use of it, and how
Latin America sought to cope with that power and even benefit
from it.
This power asymmetry gave rise to two consistent, if somewhat
contradictory, foreign policy goals in Latin America's approach to
the United States throughout its modem history: (1) to constrain
what Latin Americans perceive as the interventionist tendencies of
our power (and I use the adjective to indicate not just physical in-
tervention, but the whole set of consequences and effects that flow
from the mere existence of our predominant margin of power-all
that was summed up in Trudeau's famous metaphor of being in bed
with an elephant) and (2) to harness United States power in behalf
of their own development and modernization.'
Given the disparities in bilateral leverage, Latin American na-
tions have consistently used a strategy of resorting to international
fora and to juridical obligations and commitments to secure con-
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straints and commitments from the United States. In the early part
of this century, Latin American fears centered on direct United
States military intervention, and their strategy brought about the de
jure acceptance by the United States in the '30s and '40s of the legal
principle of non-intervention. In more recent times, Latin Ameri-
can concerns have focused primarily on the uses and ramifications
of United States' economic power, and this has led to the prevailing
concern-and fear--of "dependency" cum vulnerability.
This prevailing concern parallels and reflects long-standing
differences in concepts of sovereignty and their juridical ramifica-
tions, which have resulted in such things as the Calvo Doctrine,2
arguments over the relationship of the State to foreign nationals
and foreign owned property, and conditions that should or should
not attach to foreign assistance and aid. In the Latin American
view, for example, actions by a state to control foreign business
within its borders or define territorial sea limits are acts of complete
sovereignty. On the other hand, extension of trade and aid benefits
to underdeveloped countries by developed countries are viewed as
matters of international obligation. The United States view is al-
most the reverse: the rights of a state to control foreign business
enterprises within its borders, or to define its seaward limits are
contingent upon international law. The extensions of aid or trade
benefits are unilateral acts of complete sovereignty.
In the face of Latin American insistence on the unconditional
nature of sovereignty in regard to such questions as foreign invest-
ment, the United States has resorted in the past to the denial of
assistance or other economic benefits as a means of obtaining a
hearing for United States rights. The Hickenlooper3 and Gonzales
amendments, and more recently some Trade Act provisions, were
in this tradition.
In Latin America, such actions have been viewed as forms of
coercion or intervention. Resorting to their strategy of attempting
to constrain our power juridically, Latin Americans have sought to
modify economic behavior and create commitments to limit the use
of economic power to achieve political or economic ends. Peru, for
example, sponsored moves to amend the Rio Pact4 to include arti-
2. C. CALVO, 3 CARLOS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE. 1276
(5th ed. 1896).
3. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)(1) (1979).
4. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Sept. 2, 1947 62 Stat.
1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77.
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cles on collective economic security, i.e. legally binding agreements
proscribing acts of economic coercion.
More recently, the historic reaction to intervention and depen-
dency in Latin America and the efforts to deal with the economic
power of the United States merged with similar rising concepts and
aspirations in the Third World, which in effect has challenged the
legitimacy of the established rules of the game in the international
economic system. Once again, Latin Americans utilized legal fora,
turning to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD), the Group of 77, the North-South dialogue and
the concept of a New International Economic Order.
5
Latin Americans have been aware that the economic power of
the United States can provide benefits as well as problems. But
here too, Latin Americans have felt vulnerable to the uncertainties
(they might say the unreliabilities) of this relationship. Appropria-
tions go up and down, trade barriers come and go, pressures are
placed on international lending agencies for certain ends, and eco-
nomic policy decisions are often taken which may deeply affect
Latin America without taking that into account.
Again the Latin American response to dealing with the preca-
rious nature of economic benefits from the United States has been
to seek juridical commitments; that is, to make cooperation on eco-
nomic matters obligatory rather than discretionary. This was the
thrust of such things as the Mexican-sponsored United Nations
Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of Man,6 and, of
course, the heart of the current North-South debate.
Differences in power exist in perceptions as well as in fact, of
course. I want to stress this psychological or perceptual dimension
because it so often passes unnoticed and unrealized. Because we
Americans have been so persistently on the beneficial side of an
unequal power situation, we often simply fail to realize how power
asymmetry affects the weaker side's perceptions and beliefs. There-
fore, we often ascribe the wrong motives or analysis to a given situ-
ation. Humans are egocentric. It is very easy for us to believe that
the facts and circumstances we must take into account in Washing-
ton constitute the "universe" within which all actors must act, as
well as the objective reality which everyone else must surely see
and understand in the same way we do.
5. Latin America and the Caribbean, supra note 1, at 63.
6. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES OF MEX-
ico, 5 (April, 1981).
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The truth, of course, is much different. Something marginally
important to Washington-and which may, therefore, go unat-
tended-may also be, and often is, crucial to a given Latin Ameri-
can country. What seems mutually advantageous from
Washington's perspective may genuinely seem exploitative when
considered from a Latin American perspective. What seems to a
rich consumer nation to be a fair price for a particular resource,
may genuinely seem paltry to a country with few other resources.
Differences in power, the history of previous bargaining, the
lingering fear that onerous terms may be imposed, and the percep-
tion of continuing power disparities can hinder efforts to obtain an
"objectively" fair result through bargaining. Sometimes the oppo-
site of what the United States intends can happen. Instead of a
sense of consultation and the building of a common structure which
the United States might honestly be seeking, the United States may
convey the appearance of a large power imposing its will and tell-
ing others what to do.
Misunderstandings of this kind are particularly likely when a
United States decision which significantly affects Latin America is
not made as a Latin American policy decision. Examples are plen-
tiful: the 1971 import surcharge, the Trade Act of 1974, and more
recently policies regarding sugar, tin and other commodities. Some
of these actions are domestic policy decisions taken with little refer-
ence to their international effects. Other actions are recognized as
foreign policy decisions, but are made independently of Latin
American policy. In situations such as these, the ramifications for
Latin America are either not perceived or are traded off for other
goals.
Hemisphere affairs, in short, have been conditioned by funda-
mental differences in perceptions of reality, in notions of what is
just or proper, and in the conceptions of our relationship. At their
core, these differences reflect the persistent asymmetry of power
that has historically characterized relations in this hemisphere.
I. DYNAMICS AT WORK
But in the last two decades, something very interesting has
happened. Structural conditions on both ends of the equation have
significantly changed. The loss by the United States of its predomi-
nant global margin of strategic superiority, technological leadership
and economic power has meant a decline in the relative power of
the United States throughout the world and in its capacity to domi-
Vol. 12
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nate the region. On the other hand, significant and cumulative
growth sustained over three decades has transformed Latin Ameri-
can societies and institutions, as well as the very nature of United
States-Latin American relations. Power asymmetry still exists, of
course. The United States is still Latin America's largest single
trading partner, supplier of technology, and creditor, and is looked
to for solutions to major problems. But the overall context, the na-
ture of the dynamics, the relative relationships and the regional
trends have all changed so profoundly that the nature of the rela-
tions has been fundamentally altered. Neither the scenery nor the
actors are quite the same.
Latin America is the most highly industrialized region in the
developing world. The region has more than tripled its real prod-
uct since 1950. Latin America's population is now almost two-
thirds urban and almost three-fourths literate. Life expectancy at
birth has increased from below 40 years in 1948 to over 60 years
today. In 1960, total gross investment in the region represented 20
percent of gross domestic product (GDP); by the end of the 1970s,
that figure had risen to almost 30 percent.7 Latin American women
have moved massively into the labor force. Industry now accounts
for a share of the gross national product (GNP) similar to agricul-
ture. Dramatic improvements in transportation and communica-
tion are bringing the region together in unprecedented intimacy, as
well as incorporating the entire region into the world economy.
Latin American economies have become integrated into the
world political economy through trade patterns, expanded invest-
ment, capital flows and international debt; thereby creating new
and interlocking relationships with the international economic sys-
tem. With an average per capita GNP of over $1,000, Latin
America is pulling apart from the less-developed countries that
constitute the bulk of the Third World. Latin American living
standards are approaching those of Southern Europe. Public bu-
reaucracies are gaining in strength, responsibility and capacity; uni-
versities have grown and diversified; public administration schools
and technical faculties have proliferated; professional associations
have grown in diversity and sophistication; and finally, military es-
tablishments have become more professional.
But something even more profound has occurred which we
need to understand: Economic and social progress have been
7. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1980-1981, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PRO-
GRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 9. "
407
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brought to the center of the Latin American political agendas.
Whether it is called modernization, development, or even national
security (in a number of countries economic development is con-
ceived of in security terms and objectives), economic development
has become the paramount national objective throughout Latin
America. Economic modernization and policies to achieve it are
serious--even grim business for all the countries of Latin America.
Why is this so? The answer, I think lies in what "modernization" is
all about.
The process called economic development is not primarily eco-
nomic at all. We tend to think of development as a campaign of
production to be fought with budgets and monetary policies, and
measured with indices of output and income. But the development
process is much wider and deeper. To be sure, in the end what is
hoped for is a rise in output and productivity. But growth will not
come to pass until a series of changes, at once more basic and more
delicate, has been carried along a certain distance. To overcome
poverty, industrialize, achieve greater social justice and develop
and deepen productive economic sectors, most of these countries
will have to modernize their entire societal structure in very deep
ways. Modernization thus frequently results in a substantial redis-
tribution of political and economic power. It is the touching of
power structures and patterns that makes modernization so politi-
cally difficult and volatile, because existing patterns of organization
and values are often resistent to change. Hence, modernization for
many Latin American countries involves a process of basic change
and re-organization in the values, attitudes, and behavioral norms
of these cultures.
And that, in a nutshell, is what political dynamics and
processes are all about in Latin America today. Political struggles
and debates now center on how these societies are to organize
themselves to deal with such matters as the efficiency of systems,
welfare maximization, productivity, conflicts over the distribution
of national product, and the power and bargaining elements that
enter into these things. What models of governance are best? What
kind of priorities ought government to give to such things as social
grievances, material progress, human rights, fiscal stability, job cre-
ation, inflation, order, liberty?
In those nations where political processes are brittle, or where
transitionary systems are in effect, these are literally life and death
matters for governments; and the perilous path between the pitfalls
Vol. 12
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of repression and demagoguery leaves a very narrow margin for
error. Painful dilemmas are posed: growth vs. equity; state plan-
ning vs. market forces; import-substitution vs. export-led growth
models; and, debates over the relative need for authoritarian, cor-
poratist or democratic models of national governance (or eclectic
versions thereof). Some of the political questions that may thus lie
ahead for Latin American countries are: Can economic efficiency
be achieved in a democratic framework? Can social justice and eq-
uity be achieved without it? Where economic growth has been ac-
complished in an authoritarian setting, is democratization likely? If
the redistribution of income and the correction of social inequities




How do all of these circumstances manifest themselves in op-
erational terms? Probably the single most serious political vulnera-
bility for most of these countries is the employment challenge. In
the next 20 years the labor force in Latin America is expected to
increase by about 100 million. Even if population growth were to
drop to zero tomorrow, past population growth has already put fac-
tors in place which will lead to unprecedented growth in the labor
forces over the next decade. And in those societies where the bulk
of the population is under twenty-one, there is obviously a built-in
momentum for future population growth as these persons reach
child-bearing ages.
Given the already high levels of underemployment and abso-
lute poverty, the task of expanding productive employment and in-
come opportunities cannot be over dramatized. Obviously over the
next decade or two, the adequacy of the response to the employ-
ment challenge will depend upon the design and implementation of
appropriate agricultural, industrial and fiscal policies to sustain
economic growth. But if the dimensions of growth in the labor
force are to be more manageable beyond the next generation, popu-
lation planning policies will have to play a central role.
B. Urbanization
Latin America also has one of the most dramatic rates of ur-
banization in the world. Urbanization rates exceed population
7
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growth rates in every country in the region. About 40 percent of
Latin America's population lived in urban areas in 1950; over 60
percent do so now, and about 80 percent will be urbanized by the
turn of the century. The expansion of large cities has been particu-
larly dramatic. In the mid- 1970s for example, Mexico City and Sao
Paulo each grew by over half a million people annually.8 By the
year 2000, the World Bank projects that at its present rate of urban-
ization, Mexico City will have a population of 30 million inhabit-
ants,9 three times the present population of the New York
metropolitan area.
Modern industrial and service activities benefit from the econ-
omies of scale, and to the extent that industrialization and struc-
tural change are a necessary adjunct of economic development, the
impetus for urban growth is probably inexorable. Thus the policy
problem will not be how to stop urbanization--that will probably
not be possible-but rather how to promote the equitable growth of
cities. Sociologists point out that internal migration and urbaniza-
tion are not intrinsically good or bad; they may be functional for
the migrant, and they may in fact increase the division of labor and
thus the fuller integration of the population into the market econ-
omy. The existence of large urban masses not apparently involved
in the formal sector of the economy may not be the negative factor
it appears to be on the surface. Almost half of the urban migrants
are absorbed into an "informal system of employment."' 0 This in-
formal sector is much more than a survival system. It is linked to
the formal sector, and many sociologists argue that it has within it
some dynamic features relating to accumulation, innovation, pro-
ductivity and entrepreneurship. Obviously more study of the na-
ture and meaning of the informal economy is essential."
8. Latin America and the Caribbean, supra note 1, at 63.
9. Id.
10. "Informal Sector [also referred to as the informal system of employment] refers to
the large volume of self-employed in a developing country who are engaged in small-scale
labor-intensive work such as tailoring, food preparation, trading, shoe-repairing, etc. These
people are often regarded as unemployed or underemployed as they cannot be included in
national employment statistics, but they are often highly productive and make a significant
contribution to national income." D. PEARCE, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS
209-10 (1981). For a further explanation of the informal sector, see Sethuraman, The Urban
Informal Sector.- Concept, Measurement and Policy, 114 INT'L LAB. REV. 69 (1976).
11. For a discussion of the informal sector and developing countries, see 0. J.
FAPOHUNDA & H. LUBELL, LAGOS: URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 57-61 (1978);
H. JOSHI, H. LUBELL & J. MOULY, ABIDJAN: URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN
THE IVORY COAST 49-62 (1978); K. SCHAEFER, assisted by C. R. SPINDEL, SAO PAULO: UR-
BAN DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 63-80 (1976); INT'L LABOUR ORGANIZATION, IM-
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Rapid urban growth does, of course, have negative aspects
such as peripheral or precarious settlements, housing shortages,
problems of providing basic services, deterioration of environment
and services, and, if the agglomeration is in one or two major cities,
the political dangers exist of making them unmanageable. The phe-
nomenon of urbanization is subtle and intricate and subject to
myths; it thus requires considerable further study and analysis, in-
cluding the testing of conventional theories.
C. Migration
Another serious issue is the problem of external migration and
refugees. International migration has surged upward dramatically
in the last decade. Migration is a multi-faceted phenomenon: pov-
erty-stricken refugees as well as professionals seeking better oppor-
tunities, or merely workers filling labor shortages. A hemisphere
map of migration would reveal numerous crisscrossing flows
throughout the region: Mexico-United States; Caribbean-United
States; Colombia-Venezuela; Colombia-Eduador; and Bolivia-Ar-
gentina. The pace of external labor migration will probably accel-
erate in the near-term, with the direction toward traditional,
higher-wage countries. The flow will also get entwined with polit-
ical refugee flows, such as that from Haiti and Central America,
thereby complicating its management.
Such migration flows constitute new strains on the interna-
tional system and can create serious international complications.
In the past, legal migration has been a source of creativity and
much needed diversity for the receiving country. One problem is
that such movements have often denuded sending countries of rela-
tive scarce skills. The greatest problems, however, have come from
the illegal flow of people seeking economic opportunity or the large
flows of people fleeing repressive political conditions. In these
cases families are divided, people are endangered by hazardous
transits by sea and land, and are subject to arrest and exploitation
in the receiving countries. These immigration and refugee issues
confront many of the countries of the Americas, and their potential
PROVEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE AND WORK OF PEASANTS, AGRICULTURE
WORKERS AND OTHER COMPARABLE GROUPS: EMPLOYMENT, INCOMES AND EQUALITY IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 4-17 (1974); Weeks, Policies/or Expanding Employ-
ment in the Informal Urban Sector of Developing Economies, 111 INT'L LAB. REV. 1 (1975);
Sethuraman, Urbanization and Employment. .4 Case Study of Djakarta, 112 INT'L LAB. REV.
191 (1975); Souza & Tokman, The Informal Sector in Latin America, 114 INT'L LAB. REV.
355 (1976).
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seriousness makes them issues requiring immediate multinational
attention.
D. Redistribution of Income
The income distribution question will also become an increas-
ingly controversial source of political debate. Statistics show that
the distribution of benefits to the poorest fifth of the population has
been lower in Latin America than for developing countries in any
other geographic area. Clearly, if the hemisphere's poor (especially
the marginal and specifically the burgeoning numbers of youth) are
not enabled to become productive and enter their nation's active
life, serious instabilities will result. Thus poverty, relative and ab-
solute, even in the middle-level countries with relatively advanced
economic and institutional systems, is likely to be a continuing
source of some political tension. There are, after all, political limits
as to how much inequality a society can tolerate.
In short, human development (the realization of human poten-
tial) is a prerequisite for the hemisphere's stability and progress in
the years ahead. It is important to understand human develop-
ment, not as just a nice humanitarian gesture, but as a vital invest-
ment necessary to economic growth and national well-being. The
"redistributive" actions that are required are not redistribution of
existing income from haves to have-nots; but rather the distribution
to those who do not have income of basic means to become produc-
tive, to create wealth, to survive. The means to achieve this span
the range from nutrition, education and health services, to available
credit, appropriate technology, and managerial assistance.
The issue of "redistribution" raises the frequently cited di-
lemma of "growth vs. equity", about which a word is necessary
here. To a great degree, I believe that this is a false dilemma. The
goals of growth and equity are not antagonistic. Absolute trade-
offs are unlikely, even though some trade-offs may occur at the
margins. In fact, empirical data suggest that, far from curtailing
growth to improve income distribution, growth should be acceler-
ated to bring into play the economic and institutional forces that
insure more economically egalitarian societies.
Equity and growth strategies, in short, are interacting poles.
Pure growth and free market play will not automatically result in
Vol. 12412
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equity. But resolution of social problems, human development,
and achievement of structural change are not possible without
growth.
E. International Trade
If there is a direct correlation between economic growth and
internal political dynamics, an equally direct connection exists be-
tween the prospects for such growth and the state of the world
economy. Latin America's emergence into the world arena had the
advantage of broadening access to resources and increasing oppor-
tunities for development. But this growth also made the region
more vulnerable to development elsewhere. Global economic is-
sues are thus being driven to the top of Latin America's agenda.
Long-range objectives are being superseded by such pressing
problems as the financing of current imports and the servicing of
the foreign debt.
Probably nowhere is this link between domestic matters and
political stability on the one hand, and the interdependence of the
world system on the other, more evident than in the matter of trade.
Clearly, trade liberalization and output growth are mutually rein-
forcing. The capacity of the political systems in all of these coun-
tries to manage political, social and economic pressures will
depend, as has already been indicated, on the prospects for eco-
nomic growth. If, as seems to be the case, that growth in turn de-
pends largely upon export growth, then the capacity to export
becomes literally crucial to all of the Latin American countries.
The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable. The fate of the de-
veloping countries lies in the capacity of the developed markets to
absorb the exports of developing countries. For Latin America, it is
the United States which will matter the most. Even though depen-
dence on the United States' market has diminished, the United
States still takes more than one-third of the region's total exports.
For individual countries the figure is considerably higher. In Mex-
ico, for example, two-thirds of its exports go to the United States.' 2
12.
Percentage of Total Exports to the U.S.
1970 1973 1978
Mexico 63.70 62.94 60.37
Guatemala 35.31 31.74 34.86
Belize 33.70 33.59 41.60
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The export growth of many Latin American countries has be-
come essential for their overall growth in another way as well;
namely, to permit them to earn the wherewithal to meet the interest
cost of their external debt. Much of the growth of the Latin Ameri-
can countries in the last ten years was financed by foreign loans. As
a consequence, the region's debt accumulation has been more rapid
than that of any other part of the developing world; ballooning
from $10 billion in 1965 to a staggering $150 billion last year. Bra-
zil, alone, has the largest foreign debt burden of any developing
country in the world-an estimated $65 billion. A number of coun-
tries, notably, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Argentina and Vene-
zuela, have significant debt burdens in terms of percentages of their
GNP.
Debt has, in fact, become the principal form of capital inflow
into the region. Direct investment, a major capital source a decade
ago, now accounts for only 10 percent of capital inflow. Private
commercial banks, moreover, have become the region's principal
creditors, being responsible for 40 percent of the officially guaran-
teed debt, compared to 10 percent just ten years ago.
Obviously, the ability to service this debt and refinance loans
depends upon the growth of exports and on total growth. Indeed,
the viability of Latin America's debt structure, which is now inter-
locked with the money markets of the developed countries, espe-
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Trade questions, in my judgement, are going to be among the
most difficult and neuralgic issues facing the United States over the
next ten years. The commitment of the United States to liberal
trade practices will be sorely tested. Furthermore, the United
States will not just be asked to admit the importation of raw materi-
als and textiles as it has in the past. It will soon have to face the
export from Latin America of high-technology goods such as steel,
motor vehicles, chemicals, and electronic products. Thus, one of
the real emerging issues that the United States will face in the 1980s
is nothing less than the redeployment of industrial capacity within
the hemisphere and the specialization of labor with all that this im-
plies. This evolution will involve not only division of labor with
industrial countries in the production of manufactured items, but
also the vertical integration of industrial sectors across national
boundaries.
Latin American countries, in sum, will increasingly need to ad-
just to payment imbalances, higher energy costs, development
needs, and all at a time when demand for many of their exports has
slowed and the outlook for capital flows is unpromising. In addi-
tion, many developing countries must deal as well with serious
problems of poverty in all of their socio-political aspects. Most na-
tions, therefore, necessarily face a very difficult agenda that encom-
passes the simultaneous need to industrialize, raise productivity,
maintain export-growth, increase agricultural production, create an
internal market infrastructure, expand education and training pro-
grams, and confront vast needs on the health and welfare front.
None of these problems are likely to be managed very successfully
over the long haul without economic growth.
III. INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE
Three other factors have significantly changed the context of
inter-American relations, especially intra-Latin American relations,
and hence are worth brief note. One is the fact that global eco-
nomic indicators conceal marked differences in the rate and struc-
ture of development among hemisphere nations.
While all countries have improved in absolute terms, the rela-
tive gap between the richer and poorer nations has increased, and
13
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has implications of its own. The larger countries have new indus-
trial muscle and significant institutional growth. They are, there-
fore, better able both to adjust to external economic crises and to
continue growth. The interests, viewpoints and perspectives of
these countries, and therefore, their policies, goals and objectives,
are increasingly different from the smaller, poorer countries. These
advanced developing countries can now, themselves, play roles of
assistance and influence, as Mexico and Venezuela have demon-
strated in Central America and the Caribbean.
A second factor is the remarkable proliferation and intensity of
transnational contacts among elements in the various societies, for
instance: the institutional and personal links created by increased
trade and investment; scientific exchanges and academic links; pro-
fessional associations; labor union cooperation; and, increased
tourism. These contacts have clearly existed for some time, but ad-
vances in transportation and communication technology have mul-
tiplied and solidified them to the point where they are almost
international interest groups. What is significant here is that such
transnational actors now can and do operate cooperatively. Hence,
the nonofficial or nongovernmental patterns of transnational inter-
est groups and societal links establish a new context and framework
for hemisphere relations.
A third factor consists of a particular kind of transnational link
that is especially significant-the link among political parties. Ef-
fective cooperation has been established among parties of similar
ideology to a degree more intense than before. Latin American
political parties do not have either links or relationships with the
two United States parties, but they do have ideological affinities
and links with European parties, namely with the Christian Demo-
crats and the Social Democrats.
13
There is an organized, international association of Christian
Democrat parties. The Social Democrats and Socialist Parties of
Europe and Latin America are also grouped together in a formal
organization wherein representatives meet periodically. Their rela-
tionships have at least two important consequences. First, they
mean that a party that comes to power, such as the Christian Dem-
ocrats in El Salvador, or the Social Democrats in the Dominican
Republic, can expect to look to sister parties in other countries for
13. For a discussion of Latin American Politics, see J. BERNARD, S. CERQUEIRA, P.
GILHODES, H. GRAILLOT, L. MANIGAL & H. NEIRA, GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF
SOUTH AMERICA (1973); and R. ALEXANDER, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1973).
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support and help. Second, they have made these party groupings
international actors with foreign policy effect, and that is what is
happening in Central America today. Party links have existed
before, of course; for example, the F'gueres-Munoz Marin-
Betancourt links.' 4 But the networking with European parties and
among Latin American parties is more formal and widespread than
before, and this is a new element in Latin American politics.
IV. CARIBBEAN BASIN
Not all countries in the region, of course, have shared in the
progress and increasing capacity to modernize. Central America
and the Caribbean exhibit the kinds of turmoil and dynamics remi-
niscent of the sixties. The two areas have essentially the same ge-
neric problem but in quite different political contexts. The generic
problem is that severe economic and social inequities and malad-
justments translate into political strains, instability and the poten-
tial for radicalization.
In Central America, the problem is that the old order of essen-
tially authoritarian, stratified systems is eroding under the com-
bined pressure of endemic socio-economic problems and inequities,
growing popular demands for change and the inability of tradi-
tional elites to meet them, and of destabilizing external influences
ranging from Cuba to energy costs and inflation. But if the old
order is passing, a new balance has yet to take hold and the struggle
is developing into violence and bitterness.
In the Caribbean, the problem is how essentially open demo-
cratic systems (with the exception of Haiti) cope with serious eco-
nomic and social problems such as massive unemployment and
economically nonviable mini-states. Violence is not traditional in
the region, but generational conflicts lead younger leaders into deep
frustration, making radical models tempting to them.
All of these issues are immensely complicated. Other speakers
at this conference will deal with them in greater detail. I will sim-
ply limit my comments to a brief observation: The problems of
both the Caribbean and Central America obviously constitute
classically troubled waters in which mischief-makers can fish as
Cuba is doing. Cuba is not the cause of problems in either area but
it clearly seeks to become a major beneficiary of turmoil. In the
14. See, C. AMERINGER & D. PEPE, A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF JOSE FIQUERES OF
COSTA RICA (1978).
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context of the serious problems that exist, Cuba's longstanding ties
with indigenous revolutionaries, and the concrete assistance it pro-
vides some of them could make a critical difference, especially if
there is no countering influence or help from anywhere else. If the
region is left in isolation, Cuba's potential to increase its influence
grows accordingly. By the same token, concentration on just the
exogenous factors without also dealing with the internal, domestic
situations in truly remedial ways will provide no basis for long-
term stability and progress.
V. NEW RELATIONSHIPS
Finally, let me lay out briefly three other threads in this com-
plex picture of hemisphere relationships. Nuclear power is becom-
ing a major new item. Brazil and Argentina have undertaken
massive new programs to acquire technology for the production of
nuclear power. Other nations will undoubtedly soon follow. In the
current state of the art, the nuclear fuel cycle for electricity produc-
tion also produces plutonium, which means the capacity to produce
weapons. Both Argentina and Brazil have insisted on having full
access to and control of the entire fuel cycle, which would give
them the potential to produce weapons. Hence, nuclear prolifera-
tion has become a major question in the area and a major agenda
item in our relationship with both countries. Brazil and Argentina
have the capacity to complicate the global proliferation picture, or
both can be key elements in developing international agreements
on satisfactory safeguards.
A second development is the matter of regional governance
and subregional cooperation. No region of the world has a longer
history of international organization and cooperation. The hemi-
sphere has the most elaborate system of international governance in
the world outside of Europe. In addition to the region-wide organi-
zations of the inter-American system, growing instances of subre-
gional groupings suggest that new patterns may be developing
around such subregional "building blocks." The Andean Group,
formed around the Andean Common Market, is a prime exam-
ple' 5-but there are others. The Caribbean has economic coopera-
15. The Andean Group refers to the countries of Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Venezuela, who were signatories to the "Andean Agreement of Subregional Inte-
gration," commonly referred to as the Cartagena Agreement. The objective of the Cartagena
Agreement was to improve the economic conditions of the Andean region through economic
subregional integration. The Cartagena Agreement was signed in Bogata, Columbia on May
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tion institutionalized in some four different organizations,
including a subregional development bank. Even in strife-ridden
Central America, the pull of subregional association remains
strong. Last year, eleven nations (Spanish-speaking South
America, Mexico and Brazil), signed a treaty establishing a new
organization; the Latin American Integration Association to re-
place the defunct Latin American Free Trade Association.' 6 Two
weeks ago, member countries of the Latin American Economic Sys-
tem (SELA) met in Panama to discuss economic relations with the
United States. Last spring, senior economic officials from all the
Latin American countries, meeting under the auspices of the
United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), discussed a regional development strategy that puts new
stress on self-help and cooperation among themselves, including
help from the more advanced to the less advanced. South-South
(or horizontal cooperation) is becoming an increasingly discussed,
as well as feasible strategy. Finally, concrete joint needs have re-
sulted in specific, active, subregional cooperation around river ba-
sin development, as in the case of the River Plate Basin 7 and the
Amazon Pact. 18
Third, four decades of international peace in Latin America
have made this region the most peaceful developing area in the
world by far. But there is no assurance that peace will continue.
There are a number of deep border disputes between various coun-
tries. Nationalism is still strong. Arms expenditures are at record
levels for Latin America. Several initiatives for arms restraints for
the region have not prospered. With an increase in national capaci-
ties, and internal tensions in some cases, conflict is not inconceiv-
able in the 1980s. A realistic view would seem to be that, for the
26. 1969, by Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru. 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969). On Febru-
ary 13, 1973, Venezuela became a member of the Andean Group. Final Act of the Negotia-
tions Between The Commission of the Cartagena Agreement and the Government of
Venezuela for the Adherence of That Country to the Agreement, 12 I.L.M. 344 (1973). For a
further discussion of the Andean Group, see R. FONTAINE, THE ANDEAN PACT: A POLIT-
ICAL ANALYSIS (1977); L. MYTELKA, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
(1979). Ferris, The Andean Pact.- .4 Selected Bibliography 13 LATIN AM. RESEARCH REV.
No. 3 at 108 (1978); Grosse, Foreign Investment Regulation in the Andean Pact. The First Ten
Years, 33 Inter-Am. Econ. Aff. 77 (Spring 1980).
16. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Au-
gust 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (1981). See generally Montevideo Treaty, February 18, 1960,
INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING
TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA 207 (1968).
17. Treaty on the River Plate Basin, April 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 905 (1969).
18. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, I.L.M. 1045 (1978).
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decade ahead, it will be more important than ever that the effective-
ness and efficiency of the inter-American system's peacekeeping
and dispute settlement mechanisms be imp'roved.
VI. CONCLUSION
To summarize: change and growth in the region and in the
world have fundamentally altered the societies and institutions of
Latin American nations and transformed the nature and meaning
of inter-American relationships. Deep changes are occurring in all
of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. They have
different meanings and take different forms in different countries.
In the larger, more differentiated and institutionalized national
contexts, for example Brazil and Mexico, the dynamics are of a
more conventional and less volatile kind. In more primitive and
smaller contexts, as in Central America, the manifestations are
more volatile, more conflictive and uncertain. But in all cases, geo-
graphic and historic factors, and the international role these dy-
namic countries can play, make a constructive relationship with
them of profound consequence to the United States.
Indeed, as one looks at Latin America in the 1980s, particu-
larly the larger countries such as Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela,
one could argue that Latin America is a coming force in the world.
The larger countries particularly are likely to continue relative dy-
namic progress and growth. Some of them will, over the next gen-
eration, be increasingly able to compete with the First World, not
only in the production of agriculture and industrial items, but in
science and technological innovation as well. Basing their growth
on exports, these nations will press the industrialized countries hard
for market access. The larger ones, like Brazil, will probably do
well competing with industrialized countries in Third World mar-
kets. These countries will stimulate South-South relationships and
be leaders therein. They will have ambitious ideas and the increas-
ing ability to fulfill them.
Latin America and the Caribbean, in short, are becoming in-
creasingly important to the prosperity and security of the United
States, and more relevant to the domestic lives of Americans than
ever before. The strains of global interdependence, the economic
uncertainties now plaguing the developed and developing alike,
and global balance of power considerations, make relationships
within the Western Hemisphere more important than ever before.
Hence, increased cooperation on a regional and subregional basis is
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vital both to good bilateral relations in the Americas and to the
building of a more effective global order.
And that brings me full circle to my opening remarks. The
problem most of us Americans have in thinking about Latin
America is that we have come to consider the overwhelming domi-
nance which the United States exercised in the hemisphere after
World War II as the "normal" state of affairs. We are tempted to
believe, therefore, that if there has been a relative decline in United
States' power, especially in the sense of the power to control events,
it is because of mistakes we have made. Consequently, we con-
clude that with our own will and effort we can reverse this trend
and reinstate the normal state of affairs. And North Americans do
tend, almost reflexively, to believe that Latin Americans surely see
the world the way we do, and will surely follow the lead of the
United States and be responsive to us if we are definite enough.
However, as this presentation has sought to indicate, irrevers-
ible structural changes and diversity in the world, in the United
States, and in the hemisphere, have complicated and transformed
inter-American relations, and thereby have made the penalties of
behaving as though nothing changed in the past twenty years too
high. The emergence of Latin American nations as economic and
political entities in their own right, with extensive international
contacts and complex international roles, all make the traditional
United States claim to hegemony and dominance, or to being the
unilateral definer of hemisphere interests, both incongruent with
current reality and intolerable to Latin American nationalism. Di-
versification of political and economic relations is a major goal for
all countries in the region. As Latin American countries develop
(politically and economically) and emerge into the world scene, the
perceptions and conceptions of national interests, security threats
and goals held by the United States and Latin America will almost
surely diverge.
Therefore, in this context, Latin America's new capabilities
represent both a challenge and an opportunity for the United
States. The challenge lies in achieving a definition and understand-
ing of respective national interests among Latin American states
that are congruent with and complementary to that of the United
States. The opportunity lies in the obvious advantages the United
States can accrue by having constructive relationships and sharing
responsibilities with the nations of the hemisphere.
It is, therefore, necessary to reach back into that well-spring of
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past association and mutual cooperation and redefine the new rela-
tionship. Future relations between the United States and Latin
America must be based upon respect for the diverse perceptions
and aspirations that will grow between the two. There is no longer
any tolerance for hegemony, paternalism or dependence. The
United States must be seen as relevant to the interest of Latin
America and the Caribbean, if the possibility for cooperation and
friendship is to be maximized. In a very real sense, what is good for
the hemisphere is good for the United States.
But relevance requires vision and a sense of purpose. It will
mean attention to the region, sensitivity, compassion, commitment
and understanding. It will also mean having available an adequate
array of tools and resources, adequate commercial policies, and
help in assuring international liquidity.
And this brings us up against a basic dilemma; namely, that
there may be a fundamental contradiction between what a wise for-
eign policy for the region requires and what domestic policy will
permit. The current United States recession makes certain meas-
ures unavoidable if our economy is to be revived. What this means
for Latin American policy can be sensed if one thinks of how the
need to combat domestic inflation, curtail government expendi-
tures, and increase productivity will all relate to the simultaneous
need to encourage Latin America's export growth, cope with migra-
tion and refugees, and provide the United States' required share of
resources to stimulate development and improve international
liquidity.
Like it or not, the United States must face these contradictions.
A leadership role in the world simply cannot be carried out on the
cheap. If the United States is to continue to be a leader in the
world, then it must be prepared to pay the costs that leadership
requires. After all, as Peter Jay wrote in Foreign Affairs: "Good
regionalism is good geopolitics."' 9
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